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ABSTRACT 
 
Using panel data from US states, I measure the impact of partisanship on a wide range of 
different policy settings and economic outcomes. Across 32 measures, there are 
surprisingly few differences in policy settings, social outcomes and economic outcomes 
under Democrats and Republicans. In terms of policies, Democratic Governors tend to 
prefer slightly higher minimum wages and more redistributive taxes. Under Republican 
Governors, incarceration rates are higher, while welfare caseloads are higher under 
Democratic Governors. In terms of social and economic outcomes, Democratic 
Governors tend to preside over higher median post-tax income, lower post-tax inequality, 
and lower unemployment rates. However, for 25 of the 32 dependent variables, 
gubernatorial partisanship does not have a statistically significant impact on policy 
outcomes and social welfare. I find no evidence of gubernatorial partisan differences in 
welfare generosity, the number of government employees or their salaries, state revenue, 
incarceration rates, execution rates, pre-tax incomes and inequality, crime rates, suicide 
rates, and test scores. These results are robust to the use of regression discontinuity 
estimation, to take account of the possibility of reverse causality. Overall, it seems that 
Governors behave in a fairly non-ideological manner. 
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1. Introduction 
 
What do Democrats and Republicans do? On one level, this is the question that millions of 
American voters ask themselves as they enter the ballot boxes. Yet in an empirical sense, we 
know surprisingly little about how policy choices and welfare outcomes differ under the two 
major political parties. This paper seeks to provide evidence on partisan differences, by using 
panel data to explore the policies and outcomes under US state governments over the past forty 
years. 
 
Politico-economic models commonly characterize political parties as merely two teams of self-
interested players, willing to present any set of policies that will win them a plurality of the vote. 
Under the classic model put forward by Downs (1957), candidates’ motivations for competing 
for office are solely to enjoy its perquisites. This model is the dominant one in the literature. 
Indeed, as Roemer (2001) points out, the oft-cited “median voter theorem” is the Nash 
equilibrium result that follows from an application of the Downsian model, where voter 
preferences are unidimensional. Under Downs’ model, party ideology is irrelevant – rather than 
labeling the two largest parties “left” and “right”, one might as well call them “A” and “B”.  
 
Others, however, have attempted to explicitly model the role of ideology. Wittman (1973) 
proposes a model in which parties have policy preferences, which represent the aggregate utility 
of their members.1 Dixit and Londregan (1998) characterize redistributive ideology as 
exogenous, and show how the choice of outcomes is a function of ideology, the “power hunger” 
of each party, the variance of pre-tax incomes, and the political power of poor and rich 
constituents.  
 
Another strand in the literature goes further still, and models outcomes as a product not only of 
electoral competition between parties, but also competition within parties. Thus Dhami (2003) 
describes a system in which each party has two factions – opportunists and militants. Roemer 
(2001) goes further still – modeling three factions within each of the major parties (militants, 
                                                 
1 Roemer (2001, 28) points out that Wittman’s model has much in common with the work of Lipset (1960), who 
argued that political parties are the instruments of different economic classes. 
opportunists, and reformists), a two-dimensional policy space (left-right and authoritarian-
libertarian), and uncertainty about the mapping of policies onto outcomes. As examples of the 
issues that might characterize the left-right and authoritarian-libertarian divides, Roemer 
suggests taxation and race, respectively. 
 
What empirical evidence exists on partisan differences? Most research has partisanship has 
tended to focus on macroeconomic outcomes. Hibbs (1987) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) 
present models in which an exploitable Phillips curve is available to policymakers.2 They find 
that under Democratic Presidents, growth is higher, and unemployment lower; while under 
Republican Presidents, inflation is lower. Across developed democracies, Lange and Garrett 
(1985) and Scruggs (2001) find evidence that when countries have left-leaning governments or 
strong labor movements, they tend to grow more slowly, but the presence of both (or neither) 
leads to more rapid growth and investment. 
 
Turning to income distribution, Stigler (1970) contended that as parties pursued the median 
voter, both will tend to redistribute towards the middle class, at the expense of rich and poor. Yet 
Bartels (2003) finds otherwise. Comparing the rate of growth of each quintile in the population, 
Bartels concludes that the partisan gap is greatest for those at the 20th percentile, who can expect 
their incomes to grow 2.4 percent faster under a Democratic President than under a Republican 
President.3 When unemployment, inflation and GDP growth rates are included in the model, the 
partisan effect disappears, suggesting that at the federal level, macroeconomic management is the 
main channel through which policymakers affect the distribution of income. None of these 
models account for the potential endogeneity of party choice (though this is hardly surprising, 
given the relatively small number of US federal elections for which good income distribution 
data exists).  
 
                                                 
2 The difference between the models is that Hibbs (1987) assumes backward-looking inflation expectations, while 
Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) assume rational expectations over inflation. In support of the rational partisan model, 
Alesina and Rosenthal present evidence that the partisan gap is largest in the first half of each election term (1995, 
180-181). 
3 Bartels focuses only on the effect of Presidential partisanship. However, replicating his results with measures of 
House and Senate partisanship makes little difference to the results. 
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At a state level, studies that have found small partisan effects include Dilger 1988 (on nine tax 
and expenditure variables), Garand 1988 (on the size of the state government), Erikson, Wright 
and McIver 1989 (on an eight-item measure of party liberalism), and Poterba 1994 (on states’ 
responses to unexpected budget deficits). As Erikson, Wright and McIver note, these findings 
accord with the median voter theorem: “although state Republican and Democratic parties tend 
to represent ideological extremes, they also respond to state opinions – perhaps even to the point 
of enacting similar policies when in legislative control.”  
 
Others, however, have discerned state-level partisan differences in particular policy areas. Alt 
and Lowry (2000) show that Democrats in non-southern states tend to target a greater share of 
incomes towards government spending, with most of the effect driven by legislative partisanship. 
Consistent with this, Caplan (2001) finds that state taxation levels are positively correlated with 
the proportion of Democratic legislators, and Reed (2005) concludes that taxes are higher when 
the legislature is under Democratic control. Analyzing governors who are barred by term-limits 
from contesting the next election, Besley and Case (1995) find that Democratic governors raise 
taxes more than Republicans, while Republican governors allow the minimum wage to fall more 
than Democrats.  
 
This paper represents an advance over the previous literature in three respects. First, while some 
of the previous papers use cross-sectional variation, it uses panel data, controlling for state and 
year fixed effects that might have a direct impact on policies and outcomes. Second, it tests the 
impact of partisanship on a much wider array of policy variables and outcomes than previous 
papers have done. Third, it explicitly models the impact of voter ideology on political outcomes, 
and takes into account the possibility that party choice may be endogenous to expected economic 
circumstances in the future.  
 
In analyzing differences between Democrats and Republicans, I consider three sets of outcomes. 
The first are pure policy variables, such as the minimum wage and tax rates, which can be 
cleanly measured and which reflect only the choices made by policymakers. The second category 
of outcomes are those that reflect both policy choices and economic conditions, such as 
expenditure on transfer programs (which is a function of both the supply of and demand for 
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welfare), or the incarceration rate (a function of the strictness of the police and legal system and 
the number of crimes committed). The third category are pure welfare variables, such as mean 
incomes, unemployment, inequality, education, crime and suicide.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical strategy. 
Section 3 presents results, and the final section concludes.  
 
2. An Empirical Strategy for Estimating Partisan Effects 
 
To gauge the causal effect of partisanship on state outcomes, I focus on governors, rather than 
state legislatures. This is partly because most of the existing literature on partisanship has 
concerned itself with the affiliation of the chief executive, rather than the legislature. In addition, 
credible identification of election outcomes is more straightforward in a two-person contest. A 
governor who wins with 50.1 percent of the vote is considerably less constrained in her actions 
than a legislature in which one party holds the balance of power by a one-vote margin. 
 
To model how partisanship affects a given outcome, I regress that a given policy or outcome on 
an indicator for whether the Governor is a Democrat. Since policies and economic outcomes tend 
to be correlated within states and within years, all specifications include both state and year fixed 
effects. To this parsimonious specification, I then progressively add the following additional 
controls:  
 
(i) Time-varying characteristics of the state: The log of its population, and the fraction of 
the state’s population that is under 15, over 65, and African-American. Since many 
policies will have a differential impact on large and small states, young or old voters, or 
on ethnic minorities, these controls take account of the possibility that demographic 
composition of the state has a direct effect on the policy choices of the state government 
or the economic outcomes in a state.  
(ii) Measures of legislative control: Two indicator variables denoting that the Democrats 
control both legislative houses, and that the Republicans control both houses (the omitted 
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category is split control). This takes account of the possibility that the partisan affiliation 
of the governor may be endogenous to the partisan composition of the legislature. 
(iii) Voter ideology: The mean Poole-Rosenthal score (Poole and Rosenthal 1998) for the 
House of Representatives members representing that state in a given year. This shows the 
effect of having a Democrat or Republican Governor, holding constant the ideology of 
the states’ voters, and takes into account the possibility raised by Erikson, Wright and 
McIver (1989): that governors merely respond to voter ideology. 
 
In all cases, standard errors are clustered at the state * electoral term level. 
 
When considering economic outcomes, it is important to note that while policies take effect 
immediately, they may only have an impact on economic conditions after some lag. Given this, 
how should one treat the first year of the election term? One approach would be to simply lag all 
outcomes by one year. For example, suppose an election took place in November 2000, in which 
the Democratic candidate beat the Republican incumbent. In a lagged model, the Republicans 
would nonetheless be assigned the year 2001, and would be attributed the outcomes in the four 
years 1998-2001; while the Democrats would be considered responsible for the years 2002-2005, 
even if the Republicans were returned to office in the November 2004 election. Although such an 
approach has been adopted by Bartels (2003) and others, I prefer a more conservative method of 
dealing with the data. I will therefore drop the first year of each gubernatorial term from the 
sample, and use only across the second, third and fourth year of each term. (Where the dependent 
variable is a policy outcome, the issue of lags does not arise, and I therefore keep the first year of 
the term.) 
 
If voter choice is exogenous to expected economic conditions, then the estimates derived from 
the above specifications will accurately reflect the policy choices of Democrats and Republicans. 
However, a question of endogeneity arises. If voters are able to forecast future economic 
circumstances with some accuracy, and if they believe that the parties are differently suited to 
certain economic environments, then the party elected is not exogenous to the prevailing 
economic conditions. For example, suppose that voters thought that Democrats were better able 
to manage the economy in a slump, while Republicans were better able to manage the economy 
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in a boom. In this case, Democrats will be more likely to be elected when a recession is on the 
horizon, and the average growth rate under Democrats will be lower than that under Republicans. 
A similar mechanism could apply to other outcomes, such as crime. Thus if voter choice is 
endogenous to the anticipated socio-economic environment when making their party choice, then 
the outcomes observed under Democrats and Republicans may not reflect their respective policy 
choices.  
 
To take account of this, possibility, I add a further control to specifications that focus upon social 
and economic outcomes: 
 
(iv) The share of the vote received by the Democratic gubernatorial candidate: In this 
specification, the policy effect is estimated from the discontinuity that occurs when a 
gubernatorial candidate wins more than 50% of the vote. The use of regression 
discontinuity techniques to study US election outcomes was pioneered by Lee (2003) and 
Lee, Moretti and Butler (2004), who estimate the causal effect of incumbency on 
winning, and electoral strength on voting patterns.4 Most similar to this paper is the 
approach of Pettersson-Lidbom (2003), who uses regression discontinuity methods to 
estimate the effects of partisanship in Swedish local elections. In the regression 
discontinuity specification, I drop non-contested elections (those in which one party won 
80 percent or more of the vote), and elections in which one of the top two candidates is 
an independent.  
 
Note that the purpose of controlling for the Democrat candidate’s share of the vote is to take into 
account the function through which voters’ expectations of the state of the economy might map 
onto their choice of candidate. Note however that this assumes that governors who win with a 
larger margin will behave in the same manner as those eke out a narrow win. If this is not the 
case, it this will most likely cause attenuation bias in the coefficient of interest.5  
 
                                                 
4 However, while Lee and co-authors are able to identify 16,000 house races, there are substantially fewer 
gubernatorial elections in the post-war era. As a result, their main empirical strategies – restricting the sample to 
only the closest elections, and including high-order polynomials, are likely to both overtax the available data. 
5 There is a small body of theoretical work (Llavador 2001) and empirical evidence (Diermeier and Merlo 1999) 
suggesting that policy outcomes might be related to vote share. 
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Table 1 presents summary statistics for political variables, policy variables, intermediate 
outcomes and welfare measures. To make it more straightforward to interpret the coefficients, 
rates are recoded as percentages (ie. as 0/100 variables rather than 0/1 variables).  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics    
Variable Mean SD N 
Political variables and controls    
Democrat Governor 0.558 0.497 1992 
Democrat legislature 0.507 0.500 2132 
Democrat Governor & Democrat legislature 0.353 0.478 1875 
Republican Governor & Republican legislature 0.162 0.368 1875 
Vote share of Democrat gubernatorial candidate 0.519 0.125 2033 
Log population 14.915 1.196 2132 
Proportion of population aged under 15 0.225 0.0873 2040 
Proportion of population aged under 15 0.112 0.0253 2040 
Proportion of population who are black 0.107 0.124 2040 
Policy Settings    
Top income tax rate (%) 5.645 3.950 1959 
Top corporate tax rate (%) 5.850 2.997 2037 
Tax redistribution index 2.455 0.312 1326 
Average income tax rate (%) 15.431 3.058 1326 
Log real minimum wage 1.805 0.140 1479 
Log maximum welfare benefit 6.507 0.464 1832 
State and local employees as a percentage of the 
population (%) 
6.074 0.971 1683 
Log average real wage of a state or local employee 3.407 0.172 1683 
Intermediate Outcomes    
Unionization rate (%) 18.740 8.550 1989 
Incarceration rate (per 100,000 people) 231.681 178.607 1121 
Number of executions per 100,000 people 0.008 0.030 2132 
Log state and local transfers per capita 3.252 0.903 2039 
Log state UI payments per capita 4.444 0.677 2039 
Proportion of population receiving welfare (%) 3.751 1.879 1377 
Log real state income tax receipts per capita 5.753 1.074 1689 
Log real other state tax receipts per capita 1.762 0.938 2000 
Log real state non-tax revenue per capita 3.237 0.858 2001 
Log real state revenue per capita 5.812 0.913 2000 
Social Welfare Measures    
Log real mean family income (pre-tax) 10.274 0.190 2040 
Log real mean family income (post-tax) 10.652 0.151 1326 
Log real median family income (pre-tax) 10.103 0.190 2040 
Log real median family income (post-tax) 10.530 0.148 1326 
Log mean real wage 10.531 0.255 1275 
Fraction below the poverty line (%) 15.137 9.595 2040 
Gini (pre-tax) 37.546 3.904 2040 
Gini (post-tax) 34.550 3.629 1326 
Unemployment rate (%) 6.067 2.070 1545 
Average NAEP 4th grade score 214.890 7.309 366 
Property crimes per 100,000 people 3914.528 1482.279 2037 
Violent crimes per 100,000 people 408.865 320.115 2037 
Murder rate per 100,000 people 7.198 6.597 2037 
Suicide rate per 100,000 people 12.559 3.295 1683 
 7
 3. Estimating Partisan Differences
 
Policy Settings 
 
The first set of policies upon which one might expect to observe partisan differences are tax 
policies. To the extent that parties have differing attitudes towards redistribution, they may 
choose to raise or lower the overall tax burden, change the corporate/personal income tax mix, or 
change the redistributivity of the personal income tax.  
 
The first four rows of Table 2 estimate partisan effects for different measures of tax policies. On 
the top personal income tax rate and the corporate tax rate, there are no significant partisan 
differences. The redistributivity of personal income taxation, measured as the difference between 
the pre-tax and post-tax gini coefficients in a simulated model, appears (surprisingly) to be lower 
under Democratic governors, though the difference is small – less than 1/10th of a standard 
deviation. The average personal income tax rate does not appear to differ systematically across 
Democrat and Republican governors. 
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Table 2: Policy Settings 
Each cell is from a separate regression, and represents the marginal effect of having a 
Democratic Governor on various dependent variables 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Top income tax rate -0.0376 -0.1841 -0.1937 -0.1936 
 [0.1511] [0.1568] [0.1551] [0.1551] 
Top corporate tax rate 0.0723 -0.0644 -0.0864 -0.1114 
 [0.1161] [0.1103] [0.1095] [0.1105] 
Tax redistributivity -0.0228** -0.0172* -0.0172* -0.0173* 
 [0.0099] [0.0093] [0.0093] [0.0097] 
Average income tax rate 0.0906 0.1217 0.106 0.1164 
 [0.0865] [0.0834] [0.0828] [0.0859] 
Minimum wage 0.0092** 0.0091** 0.0089** 0.0085** 
 [0.0041] [0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0042] 
Maximum AFDC/TANF 
benefit 0.0012 -0.0013 0.0003 0.0004 
 [0.0105] [0.0103] [0.0103] [0.0105] 
Number of state 
employees -0.0202 0.0055 0.0065 0.006 
 [0.0294] [0.0238] [0.0238] [0.0242] 
Average real wage of 
state employees -0.0033 -0.0042 -0.0053 -0.0065 
 [0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0052] [0.0053] 
State and year FE Y Y Y Y 
State demographics  Y Y Y 
Legislative control   Y Y 
Voter ideology    Y 
Notes:  
1. Demographic controls are the log of the state population, and the fraction of the state’s population that is under 
15, over 65, and African-American.  
2. Legislative controls are indicator variables for the Democrats having a majority in both houses, and the 
Republicans having a majority in both houses. 
3. Voter ideology is the average Poole-Rosenthal score of the state’s delegation to the federal House of 
Representatives in the most recent election. 
 
The next rows of Table 2 analyze four additional (non-tax) policy outcomes: the minimum wage, 
welfare generosity, the number of government employees, and the wages of government 
employees. Under a Democratic Governor, the minimum wage is typically about 0.9% higher, 
which is approximately 2/3rds of a standard deviation. (As Senator Edward Kennedy is reported 
to have said to Senator John Kerry in 1994: “If you're not for raising the minimum wage, you 
don't deserve to call yourself a Democrat.”: James 2004). 
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Using the log of the real maximum welfare amount for a family of four as the dependent 
variable, I find no significant partisan differences. The same is true for the log of the number of 
state employees, and the log of the average real wage of state employees. While Republicans 
rhetoric in gubernatorial contests often focuses on reducing the size of government, this does not 
appear to be borne out in policy outcomes. 
 
Intermediate Outcomes  
 
I now proceed to estimating a set of intermediate outcomes, which are affected by both policies 
and economic and social conditions: the unionization rate, incarceration and execution rates, 
welfare rolls, expenditure on transfers, income from taxation, and state revenue.  
 
The first row of Table 3 shows the relationship between partisanship and the unionization rate. 
Although the Democrats are strongly allied to the union movement, unions do not appear to fare 
better under a state Democratic governor. The next rows indicate that incarceration rates are 
about 1/10th of a standard deviation lower under a Democratic Governor (although this finding is 
not robust to all specifications), while execution rates are unrelated to partisanship. For the most 
part, the parties are similarly “tough on crime”.6 While gubernatorial partisanship is unrelated to 
unemployment insurance receipt and transfer payments, the welfare caseload is approximately 1-
2% higher under a Democratic Governor.  
 
                                                 
6 Of course, it could be that partisanship has effects on both crime and criminal justice policies that offset one 
another. But this is unlikely to be the case, given the finding below that crime rates are not significantly correlated 
with partisanship. 
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Table 3: Intermediate Outcomes – Unionization, Incarceration and Welfare Caseload 
Each cell is from a separate regression, and represents the marginal effect of having a 
Democratic Governor on various dependent variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable
Unionization rate -0.3078 -0.2765 -0.33 -0.348 -0.2774 
 [0.2139] [0.2120] [0.2099] [0.2131] [0.3081] 
Incarceration rate -8.4465 -10.0978* -12.7136** -12.3466** -11.1447 
 [5.7933] [5.5878] [5.6528] [5.6526] [8.2858] 
Execution rate 0.0013 -0.0033 -0.0031 0.0031 0.002 
 [0.0056] [0.0052] [0.0051] [0.0044] [0.0052] 
State expenditure on 
unemployment 
insurance 0.0037 0.0152 0.0155 0.0135 -0.0005 
 [0.0230] [0.0230] [0.0231] [0.0233] [0.0345] 
State transfer 
payments per capita -0.0214 -0.0068 -0.01 -0.006 0.0165 
 [0.0226] [0.0220] [0.0224] [0.0225] [0.0323] 
Fraction of state 
population on 
welfare 0.1539* 0.1582** 0.1867** 0.1865** 0.1058 
 [0.0818] [0.0781] [0.0806] [0.0831] [0.1176] 
State and year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State demographics  Y Y Y Y 
Legislative control   Y Y Y 
Voter ideology    Y Y 
Democratic 
voteshare 
    Y 
Notes:  
1. Demographic controls are the log of the state population, and the fraction of the state’s population that is under 
15, over 65, and African-American.  
2. Legislative controls are indicator variables for the Democrats having a majority in both houses, and the 
Republicans having a majority in both houses. 
3. Voter ideology is the average Poole-Rosenthal score of the state’s delegation to the federal House of 
Representatives in the most recent election. 
4. Democratic voteshare is a linear control in the democratic candidate’s share of the gubernatorial vote. In this 
specification, non-competitive elections (those in which one candidate won more than 80% of the vote) are 
dropped. 
 
Table 4 shows four “tax and spend” variables: income tax receipts, other tax receipts (mostly 
company tax), non-tax governmental income (license fees), and total state government revenue. 
None appear to be significantly correlated with gubernatorial partisanship. Consistent with Alt 
and Lowry 2000, the coefficient on legislative partisanship is significant in the total revenue 
regressions (not shown). The partisan effects for all tax and spend variables appear to be 
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confined to legislatures – taxation and spending policies do not appear to differ significantly 
between Republican and Democratic governors. 
 
Table 4: Intermediate Outcomes – Tax and Spend 
Each cell is from a separate regression, and represents the marginal effect of having a 
Democratic Governor on various dependent variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable
State income tax 
receipts per capita -0.0528 -0.0253 -0.0111 -0.0082 -0.0899 
 [0.0541] [0.0537] [0.0518] [0.0528] [0.0796] 
State other tax 
receipts per capita 0.0095 0.0271 0.0286 0.0275 0.0620* 
 [0.0250] [0.0226] [0.0225] [0.0226] [0.0347] 
State non-tax income 
per capita 0.0078 0.0227 0.0224 0.0231 0.0171 
 [0.0271] [0.0257] [0.0260] [0.0258] [0.0359] 
State revenue per 
capita -0.0362 -0.0211 -0.0158 -0.0137 -0.0706 
 [0.0335] [0.0320] [0.0315] [0.0322] [0.0487] 
State and year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State demographics  Y Y Y Y 
Legislative control   Y Y Y 
Voter ideology    Y Y 
Democratic 
voteshare 
    Y 
Notes:  
1. Demographic controls are the log of the state population, and the fraction of the state’s population that is under 
15, over 65, and African-American.  
2. Legislative controls are indicator variables for the Democrats having a majority in both houses, and the 
Republicans having a majority in both houses. 
3. Voter ideology is the average Poole-Rosenthal score of the state’s delegation to the federal House of 
Representatives in the most recent election. 
4. Democratic voteshare is a linear control in the democratic candidate’s share of the gubernatorial vote. In this 
specification, non-competitive elections (those in which one candidate won more than 80% of the vote) are 
dropped. 
 
Social Welfare Measures 
 
The last set of dependent variables are pure social welfare measures: income, wages, 
unemployment, poverty, inequality and crime rates. With the possible exception of inequality, 
there is a broad consensus across the two parties about the importance of achieving these goals. 
However, the parties differ in the prominence that they give to these goals, with Republicans 
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tending to put greater emphasis on crime and growth, and Democrats tending to put greater 
emphasis on poverty and unemployment. To the extent that politics involves allocating resources 
from less favored to more favored projects, partisan differences in policy preferences could still 
reveal themselves in these social welfare measures.  
 
To begin with, I calculate measures of mean and median family income. Since these figures are 
not publicly available at a state level, I use microdata from the 1963-2003 Current Population 
Surveys, and calculate the equivalized family income for each individual by dividing total family 
income by the square root of the number of family members. The first set of outcomes in Table 5 
estimate the effect of partisanship on mean pre-tax and post-tax family income, median pre-tax 
and post-tax family income, and real wages. While the first three of these are small and 
insignificant, median post-tax family income is about 1% higher under a Democratic Governor 
(though this is not significant in the regression discontinuity specification). The coefficient on 
real wages is negative, but not statistically significant. Poverty rates and pre-tax inequality are 
not statistically related to partisanship, but post-tax inequality is about 1/3rd of a gini point lower 
under a Democratic Governor – providing some evidence in favor of the theory that the defining 
difference between left and right is the parties’ attitude to inequality (Bobbio 1996). 
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Table 5: Social Welfare Measures – Income and Income Distribution 
Each cell is from a separate regression, and represents the marginal effect of having a 
Democratic Governor on various dependent variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable
Mean real family 
income (pre-tax) -0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0028 -0.003 0.0042 
 [0.0059] [0.0059] [0.0059] [0.0060] [0.0091] 
Mean real family 
income (post-tax) 0.0052 0.0055 0.0045 0.0039 0.008 
 [0.0046] [0.0045] [0.0046] [0.0048] [0.0070] 
Median real family 
income (pre-tax) -0.0008 0.0014 0.0006 0.0008 0.0042 
 [0.0064] [0.0063] [0.0064] [0.0064] [0.0098] 
Median real family 
income (post-tax) 0.0096* 0.0109** 0.0107** 0.0109** 0.0115 
 [0.0054] [0.0052] [0.0054] [0.0055] [0.0080] 
Mean real wage -0.0077 -0.0077 -0.0089 -0.0098 -0.0079 
 [0.0086] [0.0082] [0.0082] [0.0086] [0.0119] 
Proportion below 
poverty line 0.0264 -0.131 -0.1071 -0.1006 -0.6038 
 [0.5098] [0.4809] [0.4852] [0.4842] [0.6986] 
Gini (pre-tax) 0.0054 -0.0646 -0.0756 -0.0995 -0.0947 
 [0.1431] [0.1411] [0.1435] [0.1434] [0.2136] 
Gini (post-tax) -0.2158 -0.2951** -0.3082** -0.3459** -0.2844 
 [0.1372] [0.1299] [0.1345] [0.1342] [0.1959] 
State and year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State demographics  Y Y Y Y 
Legislative control   Y Y Y 
Voter ideology    Y Y 
Democratic 
voteshare 
    Y 
Notes:  
1. Demographic controls are the log of the state population, and the fraction of the state’s population that is under 
15, over 65, and African-American.  
2. Legislative controls are indicator variables for the Democrats having a majority in both houses, and the 
Republicans having a majority in both houses. 
3. Voter ideology is the average Poole-Rosenthal score of the state’s delegation to the federal House of 
Representatives in the most recent election. 
4. Democratic voteshare is a linear control in the democratic candidate’s share of the gubernatorial vote. In this 
specification, non-competitive elections (those in which one candidate won more than 80% of the vote) are 
dropped. 
 
Measures of work, education, crime and suicide are shown in Table 6. Only one of these impacts 
is significant: in some specifications, the unemployment rate is 0.2–0.3 percentage points lower 
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under a Democratic Governor. Test scores, property crime, violent crime, murder and suicide are 
not significantly related to partisanship. While this could potentially be due to reporting 
differences in the case of property crime and violent crime, this is much less likely in the case of 
murder and suicide, which are almost always reported. Overall, given that Republicans are often 
typified as being “tougher” on crime than Democrats, it is interesting to find no systemic partisan 
difference in crime rates. 
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Table 6: Social Welfare Measures – Work, Education, Crime and Suicide 
Each cell is from a separate regression, and represents the marginal effect of having a 
Democratic Governor on various dependent variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable
Unemployment rate -0.1846* -0.1760* -0.1635 -0.1727 -0.2895* 
 [0.1041] [0.1003] [0.1031] [0.1050] [0.1594] 
Test scores (4th 
grade reading) 0.3775 0.2828 0.288 0.2575 0.6204 
 [0.3702] [0.3663] [0.3675] [0.3666] [0.4916] 
Property crime rate -64.938 -61.0956 -56.7582 -54.6538 56.512 
 [45.7197] [43.1164] [43.2237] [43.7809] [66.0381] 
Violent crime rate -6.6894 -10.0581 -10.3618 -9.9462 -5.9597 
 [8.2755] [7.8852] [7.8349] [7.8513] [11.3124] 
Murder rate -0.079 -0.1018 -0.0679 -0.0819 -0.0408 
 [0.1264] [0.1236] [0.1200] [0.1203] [0.1723] 
Suicide rate -0.2432** -0.1579 -0.1356 -0.1163 -0.1403 
 [0.1215] [0.1180] [0.1180] [0.1183] [0.1822] 
Robustness Check: 
Log population 0.0036 -0.0044 -0.0018 -0.0069 0.0135 
 [0.0102] [0.0099] [0.0098] [0.0088] [0.0124] 
State and year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State demographics  Y Y Y Y 
Legislative control   Y Y Y 
Voter ideology    Y Y 
Democratic 
voteshare 
    Y 
Notes:  
1. For all specifications except where the dependent variable is log population, demographic controls are the log of 
the state population, and the fraction of the state’s population that is under 15, over 65, and African-American. 
2. Where the dependent variable is log population, demographic controls are the fraction of the state’s population 
that is under 15, over 65, and African-American. 
3. Legislative controls are indicator variables for the Democrats having a majority in both houses, and the 
Republicans having a majority in both houses. 
4. Voter ideology is the average Poole-Rosenthal score of the state’s delegation to the federal House of 
Representatives in the most recent election. 
5. Democratic voteshare is a linear control in the democratic candidate’s share of the gubernatorial vote. In this 
specification, non-competitive elections (those in which one candidate won more than 80% of the vote) are 
dropped. 
 
Robustness Checks 
 
Could it be that policymakers are stymied by large offsetting interstate migration flows? In the 
context of progressive taxation, Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) argue that migration prevents state 
policymakers from redistributing income. However, Chernick (2004) and Leigh (2005) have 
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found evidence to the contrary. Similarly, looking at a broader range of policies, Wu, Perloff and 
Golan (2002) conclude that progressive taxes and the Earned Income Tax Credit reduce 
inequality within a state, while raising the minimum wage increases state inequality.7 One way 
of testing this is to see whether the election of Democrats or Republicans is systematically 
associated with population flows. This theory is tested in the final row of Table 6, which show 
small and insignificant relationships between partisanship and the size of a state’s population. 
The absence of a statistically significant relationship lends weight to the interpretation that it is 
convergent preferences rather than an inability to affect outcomes that explains these results. 
 
4. Conclusion
 
At a state level, the party in power makes little difference to most policy settings. Democratic 
Governors tend to prefer slightly higher minimum wages and more redistributive taxes. Under 
Republican Governors, incarceration rates are higher, while welfare caseloads are higher under 
Democratic Governors. In terms of social welfare, Democratic Governors tend to preside over 
higher median post-tax income, lower post-tax inequality, and lower unemployment rates.  
 
There are many areas in which gubernatorial partisanship does not appear to have an impact on 
policy outcomes and social welfare. I find no evidence of gubernatorial partisan differences in 
welfare generosity, the number of government employees or their salaries, state revenue, 
incarceration rates, execution rates, pre-tax incomes and inequality, crime rates, suicide rates, 
and test scores.  
 
There are two possible interpretations of these results. One is that the policy preferences of 
Democrats and Republicans at a state level are largely similar, while another is that there are 
strong partisan differences in policy preferences, but that cross-state migration mitigates the 
effects. However, the fact that there are small partisan differences in policy settings, coupled 
with the absence of any systematic relationship between population flows and partisanship, 
                                                 
7 Wu, Perloff and Golan (2002) do not distinguish between state and federal policies (since their models do not 
include year dummies). 
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favors the explanation that partisan policy preferences are similar. In state government, it seems 
that a donkey really does behave a lot like an elephant.  
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Data Appendix 
 
Political Variables and Controls 
 
State political variables are from ICPSR. 1995. Candidate Name and Constituency Totals, 1788-
1990 (ICPSR No. 2), 5th ed. Ann Arbor, MI; updated using figures from the Congressional 
Quarterly database. 
 
Poole-Rosenthal scores are downloaded from Keith Poole’s website 
(http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm, updated 10 December 2004). I drop all legislators except 
Democrats and Republicans, and use the first common space score, which has a potential range 
from -1 to 1, and which Poole and Rosenthal describe as picking up “liberal-conservative” in the 
modern era. For each state and election year, I calculate the mean score for legislators serving in 
the House of Representatives, and apply the same score to the following year, in which no 
election took place. 
 
The fraction of the population aged under 15, aged over 65, and who are African-American are 
calculated from the IPUMS samples of the decennial censuses, and interpolated for intervening 
years. After 2000, the figures from the 2000 census are used. 
 
Population figures are from Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/).  
 
Policy Settings 
 
Top income tax and corporate tax rates from the World Tax Database, at the Ross School of 
Business in the University of Michigan 
(http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/otpr/introduction.htm). 
 
Tax redistributivity is the amount by which the income taxation system reduces the gini 
coefficient. This measure, and average taxation rates, reflect only the tax policies, since they are 
calculated using the method outlined in Leigh (2005). In brief, this involves taking a single 
sample of respondents from the March 1990 CPS, and adjusting the average income of the 
respondents so that it is the same as the average income in a given state and year. To simplify 
calculations, I assume that all family income is wage income, that individuals file as singles, and 
couples file jointly (with 2/3rds of the income assigned to the primary earner). Dependent 
exemptions and age exemptions are taken into account. Post-tax income is net of state and 
federal taxes, but not net of FICA, which is regarded as akin to savings. Since Taxsim only 
includes state taxes from 1977 onwards, earlier years are not included in the analysis. The tax 
burden is then calculated for each state and year. From this, it is possible to calculate the tax 
redistribution index and the average tax rate. These figures reflect only policy effects, and not 
behavioral responses. 
 
Minimum wage data from 1973 from Neumark, D and Nizalova, O. 2004. “Minimum Wage 
Effects in the Longer Run”. PPIC Working Paper No. 2004.03. Public Policy Institute of 
California: San Francisco, CA. 
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EITC supplement is the percentage added by the state to EITC payments for a family  with one 
child. Most data is from Johnson, N. 2001. “A Hand Up: How State Earned Income Tax Credits 
Help Working Families Escape Poverty in 2001”. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities; updated with figures from Leigh, A. 2005. “Who Benefits from the Earned Income 
Tax Credit? Incidence Among Recipients, Coworkers and Firms”, mimeo. 
 
Maximum welfare amount is the log of the maximum real AFDC/TANF benefit for a family of 
4. AFDC/TANF caseload is the average annual caseload as a percentage of the total population. 
Both figures supplied by Robert Moffitt up to 1998; then updated using data from the 
Administration for Children and Families, Department of Family and Community Services 
(http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofa/caseload/caseloadindex.htm). 
 
State employment and salaries from Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/). State employment is the fraction of the population 
employed in state and local government. 
 
Intermediate Outcomes 
 
Incarceration rate from the Bureau of Justice Statistics - Data Online 
(http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs). Incarceration rate is the number incarcerated in state prisons per 
100,000 people per year.  
 
Execution rates calculated from M.W. Espy and J.O. Smykla. 2004. Executions in the United 
States, 1608-2002: The Espy File, 4th ed (ICPSR No. 8451), ICPSR, Ann Arbor, MI. Variable is 
the execution rate per 100,000 people per year. 
 
Unionization rate is the percentage of each state's nonagricultural wage and salary employees 
who are union members.  Estimates are based on the 1983-2002 Current Population Survey 
(CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) earnings files, the 1973-81 May CPS earnings files, and 
the BLS publication, Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations, for various 
years.  Details on data and methodology are provided in B.T. Hirsch, D.A. Macpherson, and 
W.G. Vroman, “Estimates of Union Density by State,” Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 124, No. 7, 
July 2001, pp. 51-55 (accompanying data online at http://www.trinity.edu/bhirsch). 
 
Transfers, unemployment insurance, state tax revenue, and overall state revenue from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/). Transfers and state revenue are 
expressed as the log real amount per person in the state.  
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Social Welfare Measures 
 
Average income and inequality measures are calculated from the March Current Population 
Survey, using Stephen Jenkins’ “ineqdeco” Stata routine. Since the CPS asks households about 
earnings in the previous year, the 1963-2003 surveys provide data on household income from 
1962-2002. Family income is adjusted for family size by dividing by the square root of the 
family size, and data is weighted by person-weights. Family incomes that are less than 1/10th of 
the median, and more than 10 times the median, are recoded to those values. The year 1962 was 
dropped, since it contains a substantial number of unrealistically high incomes, suggesting 
potential coding problems. Although the CPS is designed to be representative at a state level, the 
person-weights that are provided are calculated based on national demographics, rather than state 
demographics. However, this is unlikely to make a substantial difference. Using the CPS for 
California, a state whose demographic composition is very different to the nation as a whole, 
Reed, Haber and Mameesh (1996, Appendix B) used census data to form new CPS weights for 
California, and found that it made virtually no difference to their estimates of state inequality. 
 
Post-tax income and post-tax inequality are calculated by using the NBER’s Taxsim program 
(Feenberg and Coutts 1995), treating income and exemptions in the same manner as outlined in 
the “Policy Settings” section above. Since Taxsim only covers 1977 onwards, our post-tax 
estimates are only for 1977-2002. 
 
Whether a family is below the poverty line is provided in the CPS files in later years, and were 
added for earlier years by Unicon. Using this information, I calculate poverty rates for each state 
and year. 
 
Unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://data.bls.gov/). 
 
National Assessment of Educational Progress scores are from 
http://www.nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/naepdata/. Fourth grade reading scores are used on the 
basis that they are available for more states and years than any other test. 
 
Property crime rate and violent crime rate from the Bureau of Justice Statistics - Data Online 
(http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs). Crime rates are the number of crimes committed per 100,000 
people per year. 
 
Suicide rates supplied by Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, as detailed in B.Stevenson and 
J.Wolfers. 2003. “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress”. 
NBER Working Paper 10175. NBER: Cambridge, MA. Rate is the number of suicides per 
100,000 people per year. 
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